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The present paper shall attempt to describe, analyze and elaborate 
some of the communicational deficits of the children with Autism 
Disorders Spectrum Syndrome (ASD), seen from the semiotic 
viewpoint. The focus shall be on the visual capacities, [such as 
described in: (Grandin, 2008)] of the children with Autism, as well 
as on their ability to compensate their brain dysfunctionalities 
through technology.  In the mentioned context, semiotics should 
attempt at disclosing the meaning of their “own world”, to the extent 
of rendering it passionate. I shall intend by “passions” the repetitive 
requests, complaints, their emotionality etc.,   as intermediated by 
other tools (and/or media), that can be exemplified as one of the 
ways of “reducing” their sensory-motor deficits. In conclusion, the 
semiotics of passions, such as described by Greimas and 
Fontanille(1993) shall attempt deducing semantic units which are 
applicable for such children’s own “intended physiological context 
of behavior”.  The results of “actions” performed by such individuals 
shall represent their own way of establishing a meta-communicative 
process.  The deduced semantic units in terms of such children’s 
behavior are changeable, therefore an object to intersubjective 
processes of transformation.   
Keywords: passions, autistic, semiotics, behavior 
 
Introduction  
Treating Autism and/or Autism Spectrum Disorder Syndrome (ASD) out 
of the semiotic viewpoint is a complex task.Such a complexity does not 
emerge from the semiotic method only as one of the methodological 
possibilities, but as obvious, from other related fields, as well. What I 
intend by this is that the problem belongs to a wide range of other treatable 
fields ( eg. medicine, biology, psychology and social sciences) [ such as, 
for instance, observed in: (Siegel, 2003)] .  This is above all due to the 
“spectrum” concept, which is itself complex, multi-dimensional and may 
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belong either to a theoretical explication (through determined paradigms), 
or to its practical applicability through determined empirical data gained 
as a result. One has to remark in addition that the phenomenon is also inter-
and trans-disciplinary, as besides its symptoms, noticeability, and/or 
behavioral deficits in terms of such individuals, the matter can be a subject 
to various disciplines, in the shape as we have stated above.  
Otherwise, as it is hoped, the present paper shall attempt to describe, 
analyze and elaborate some of the communicational deficits in children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder Syndrome, seen from the semiotic point 
of view. The focus shall be on the visual capacities of the children with 
autism, as well as on their ability to compensate determined brain 
dysfunctionalities, through technology as one of such possibilities(such as: 
computers, smartphones, etc.), so as to intend an uninterruptable 
communicational process. The mentioned “compensation” is above all of 
a psychological nature, caused by an organic disability of the mentioned 
subjects. In such grounds, it is to emphasize that the twofold viewing of 
the problematics [ either behavioral, such as in: (Bogdashina, 2005), for 
instance, and/or neuro-biological and genetic, such as described in: 
(Roubertoux, 2015)]  , represents another complexity in the theoretical 
frame. As should be obvious, there is a remarkable difference either form 
the aspect of causes or from the aspect of consequences of such kinds of 
an individual’s behavioral manifestations. Or better expressed: the first one 
of such mentioned fields analyzes and tries to reduce the consequences, 
whereas the second one, attempts at disclosing the causes of the 
phenomenon.  
Otherwise, semiotics, as should be understandable, should not seek for a 
cause and/or consequence of the deficits we are about to discuss, but it 
should instead, identify them in the sense as they are diagnosed as well as 
attempt to foresee the context of a possible meaningfulness that should 
consequently result in a determined semantic micro-universe.  
In the mentioned context, semiotics should as well attempt at disclosing 
the meaning of “their world” (specifically, through their presumably 
“physiologically intended actions”), to the extent that such actions may 
render themselves passionate.  I shall intend by “passions” of an autistic 
child the repetitive requests, complaints and several outbursts of 
emotionality (some of which may represent so called “tantrums’ and/or 
“meltdowns”), which may and/or are usually intermediated by various 
objects or subjects, such as for instance: other tools (and/or media) and/or 
therapists. Such other tools as well as other intermediation devices may be 
explained as one of the ways of their own “reducing” their sensory-motor 
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needs and /or deficits [ which are described in: (Emmons, P.G.; Andersen, 
2005) ]. Thus in conclusion, the semiotics of passions, as a theoretical 
paradigm [ in the way as described in: (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993) ] , 
shall attempt at deducing semantic units which are applicable in frames of 
such children’s “own physiological behavioral context”.  The results of 
such “actions” by the side of the children shall represent their own way of 
establishing a meta-communicational process. In the context as presented 
above,  the impossibility of establishing of an idealistic communication 
process [ such as foreseen in: (Shannon & Weaver, 1948); and/or in: (Eco, 
1968), specifically speaking, in regard to interpersonal communication] 
shall attempt at such individuals activities’ demonstrating a basic semiotic 
function,  ( in the shape of obtaining a meaning out of a given form), so as 
to contribute to a specific sort of a process of semiosis to discuss and define 
later in this text.  My aim is  “extracting” as much as possible meaningful 
units out of such children’s prospective of viewing and comprehending 
external reality, which would contribute to  an awareness and a possibility 
of interaction within their way of communicating possibilities.  Besides, as 
it is hoped that shall be seen, semiotics in general should also treat 
interpretative values of certain behavioral models, which finally would 
overcome such a disability of essential perception and cognition processes: 
thus in addition, also rendering such kinds of activities meaningful. The 
twofold modelling of the semiotic method at this instance, (either 
ontological or epistemological), to my view, would render such children’s 
passions meaningful for the rest of the world. The first one [ such as for 
instance described in: (Deely, 2009)] shall concern the establishing of 
“basic semiotic functions”based on semiotic relations, even if they are 
conceptualized in the metaphorical sense of the word, whereas the second 
one, shall concern the “world of possibilities” [ see also: (Eco, 1994) ] , in 
relation to the interpretability of  such individual’s behavior. Only after 
elaborating these two possibilities, semiotics shall contribute to deducing 
semanticity [ thus following: (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993)] , as its final 
goal in the context of the present paper. 
 
 On some of the noticeable deficits of a child on the spectrum 
If one has initially to present a determined methodology in terms of a 
“theoretical” solving of a problematics, then, it should be logical to state 
that the elaboration of the concept and/or phenomenon under analysis has 
to be clarified. Concretely speaking, there have been several definitions of 
the syndrome, which to my view have to be explicated in this contribution. 
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This is necessary for the following purposes: first, because of the “relation” 
establishment as a semiotic tool towards its models, and second, because 
of the necessity of an ‘intermediator” at this instance. It should be 
understood in conclusion that here, the various techniques and methods 
towards re-establishing a communication process ( either intended in its 
purely communicational or in its semiotic context, specifically) shall not 
be elaborated in details[ as for instance, I have attempted to show 
elsewhere, see: (Hoxha, 2014); (Hoxha, 2015) ]. On the contrary, I intend 
by a child’s ‘physiological actions” his/her own way of re-establishing a 
meta-communicational process. Or by other words: I intend such 
individuals’ own interaction with the rest of the world, by the 
aforementioned term. It is for the sake of the existence of a determined 
meta-communication process (which is able to decompose into different 
semiotic units explicable through a signs’ behavior) that semiotics, among 
other significantly related fields, should be a part of a methodological 
discourse in relation to the ASD phenomenon. If the theoretical 
background is such as we have attempted to explain, then one should 
emphasize at least some of the behavioral manifestations of the children on 
the spectrum. 
It also has to be noted that symptoms include a wide range of behavioral 
deficits, which are visible, recognizable either for the significant others, or 
for the rest of the ‘subjects’ interacting with the child. As otherwise 
described by scholars who produce determined definitions of the 
Syndrome, [ see: (Sicile-Kira, 2014); (Mash, Eric J., Wolfe, 2004)], one 
can note that they are principally based on the behavioral deficits, or better 
expressed: on the impossibility and/or incapacity of such children to 
perform determined functions, compared to “normal social contexts”, 
and/or to neuro-typical individuals. As it is otherwise observed: 
Autistic disorder or autism is a severe developmental disorder 
characterized by abnormalities in social functioning language and 
communication, and unusual behavior and interests. It includes every 
aspect of the child’s interaction with his or her world, involves many parts 
of the brain, and undermines the traits that make us human – our social 
responsiveness, ability to communicate, and feelings for other people. 
(Mash, Eric J., Wolfe 2004: 284) 
It is for the mentioned consequences of a child’s behavior that such sort of 
behavior is seen as “abnormal”, or as I have named it elsewhere, 
exceptional [see my quoted article, above]. It should be noted in addition 
that, if the matter is treated philosophically then, the dichotomy and/or the 
distinction between “normality” and “abnormality” would not represent a 
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significant relevance [ also in the way as mentioned in: (Delleuze & 
Guattari, 1987)] . It is so, because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
multiplicity of behavior: therefore it semiotically refers to a continuous and 
transformable signs’ processing, whereby a signification process may also 
be unreliable. It is in such foreseen philosophical and ontological context 
specifically, that the problematics can be analyzed in the shape of a 
transformable “rhizome” into different assemblages, thus changing shapes 
from one sort of modelling into another.  
In regard to the mentioned context, I shall not raise the question of the 
mentioned dichotomy at this instance. One can justify this as well by the “ 
discursive and  epistemological level of analysis” [ the paraphrasing is 
mine, see: (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993)] of determined semiotic 
preconditions. It thus allows interpretative and predictable “actions” of 
such individuals, in the case of the semiotic treatment of the phenomenon. 
It is for such and similar reasons that, including the context we are 
discussing, one can allow more than one semiotic interpretation. This is 
after all aimed at an overall comprehension of such individuals own 
depicting and conceptualizing the interaction with others and significant 
others.  
Otherwise, it should be clear that the behavior of an autistic child looks 
strange, somehow different, to the rest of the world. What I intend by this 
is the lack of theory of mind. Such sort of behavior and/or communication 
with others can be described as atypical. The “atypicality”, or as otherwise 
named ‘abnormality” (and/or neurodiversity) is noticeable and visible in 
some of the issues I shall emphasize in the following lines of the present 
paper. Even though an autistic child might possess “internal speech 
behavior” [ see: (Bogdashina, 2005)], i.e. implicit comprehension of 
speech ( and/or, as shall still be explained, might possess some of his/her 
receptive abilities), the child  might not possess explicit speech.The 
explicit speech ability in autistic children is case sensitive. There cannot be 
a general view on the extent of their speaking abilities. Each case is 
individual. This last issue, as hopefully shall be seen, explains as well the 
heterogeneous behavioral kinds in terms of such subjects, most of which 
are individual, and render themselves difficult to define. One issue at least 
can be asserted: the mentioned kind of communication is inter-subjective, 
and/or it becomes subjectiviezed. It is this kind of viewing the phenomenon 
that makes the issue semiotically treatable, among naturally, other related 
issues.  
 As otherwise explained in Piaget ( 1969), the child has to possess 
“symbolic representational function” [ see: (Piaget, 1969) ] , after the age 
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of 16 or 18 months. Or by other words: if a failure of the speech component 
is demonstrated, and/or an ability of finger pointing to subjects and/or 
objects by the side of the child, approximately by the mentioned age, one 
concludes that some mental processes have delayed. In support to the 
mentioned component (i.e. the explicit verbal expressivity), as only one of 
the recognizable deficits of an individual possessing neurodiversity, I shall 
quote Piaget. As he otherwise observes:  
At the end of the sensory-motor period, at about one and half to two years, 
there appears a function that is fundamental to the development of later 
behavioral patterns. It consists on the ability to represent something (a 
signified something, object, event, conceptual scheme, etc.,) by means of 
a “signifier”, which is differential and which serves only a representative 
purpose:  language, mental image, symbolic gesture, and so on. Following 
H. Head and the specialists in aphasia we generally refer to this function 
that gives raise to representation as “symbolic”. However, since linguists 
distinguish between “symbols” and “signs”, we would do better adopt their 
term “semiotic function” to designate those activities having to do with 
differentiated signifiers as a whole. (Piaget 1969, n.p. ) 
As one can notice, Piaget’s explication here, regards normal and/or a 
normative sort of children’s developing abilities acquisition. Naturally 
now, the situation is clearer: an autistic child delays at certain stages of 
development, which may belong to various developmental spheres: such 
as, the emotional sphere, perception and cognition spheres. Let us now 
number some of the visible symptoms and/or deficits of an autistic child.  
First, a child on the spectrum may have atypical behavior. What I intend 
by this, is the following: repetitive and stereotypical actions, such as: 
movements of the head back and forth; proprioceptive integrational 
problems, such as: hitting one thing only, and /or playing with one and only 
toy in the strangest of ways. Second, an autistic child takes same food 
repetitively and persuasively, such as: bread only, or junk food and similar 
food only. Third, an autistic child, may not take notice of the presence of 
his/or parents. He/she continues performing his/herownrituals constantly. 
Fourth, an autistic child may not speak, and/or even his/her nonverbal 
communication may look strange. Instead of calling upon a subject using 
verbal expressivity, an autistic child may take one’s hand, so as to show 
what he wants to do or take. A partial or total lack of fulfilling orders may 
be noticed. Fifth, such a child has a social avoidance problem, i.e. not 
wishing to play or interact with peers of his/her age. Sixth, a child with 
autism may not hold an eye contact, as a conscious way of a nonverbal sort 
of communication. The process of a-socialization and/or de-
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contextualization is more than evident in autistic children. It is for these 
reasons that a child on the spectrum is easily noticeable to the rest of the 
world [ among other related issues, as it is as well explained in:(Sicile-
Kira, 2014)]. One has to remark here that notwithstanding the fact that 
individuals with autism do not adapt themselves to various new kinds of 
social realities (in the sense of exposing themselves to such other way of 
newly faced “social contexts”); they do not exclude constructing their own 
social reality. The difference in addition is obvious: their acquisition 
process is different, their adaption process much slower, therefore visible 
and recognizable. In conclusion this sort of their own interaction with what 
neuro-typicals do (or generally, in view of their own flow of 
living),regarding a given social reality to which they may be exposed, is 
different and exceptional. It is for this reason that one can state the 
following: if there is a lack of capacity and/or an absence of a full cognition 
process within an autistic child (a fact which cannot be taken as a general 
phenomenon, but only at separate individual cases), then perception 
processes may overcome normal provisions. Or another example: if autism 
is primarily conceptualized as a neuro-biological problem, then one can 
easily notice that an individual on the spectrum has a full body balance, 
clear movements, physical integration, etc. What can be noticed in 
conclusion is the action component, mostly performed consciously, due to 
an organic disability. It thus justifies the heterogeneous nature of the 
problem instead of the comparative one, and/or of a dichotomous one. Such 
a multiplicity of a phenomenon enables a transformation process, at least 
at various semiotic contexts.  
 
On some semiotic preconditions of autism: what does 
“compensation” mean? 
I shall use the term “compensation” in the metaphorical and/or connotative 
sense of the word. This is not only due to the indispensable organic and/or 
neurological provenience of this phenomenon, but also to the semiotic 
preconditions that may be established due to its existence. By the 
mentioned term I intend “substitution” of different actions of doing within 
other actions and/or actors [ presumably in the Greimasian sense of the 
word, see; (Greimas, 1973)], which may be and/or are due to the 
individual’s will and interests. As much as this is due to semiotic relations 
explicated by Greimas, that much it is due to his “modal functions” and 
“modalities”. In conclusion therefore, not only that the matter should be 
regarded from the ontological point of view, but as well it regards the 
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epistemological view in semiotics. As can be seen, this view shall regard 
two aspects principally: the psychological and the semiotic one, 
simultaneously. To my view in conclusion, it is only in such mentioned 
circumstances, that one can use semiotic applicative methods in regard to 
rendering various meaning components in terms of the autism 
phenomenon. To sum up then: if a child is expected to offer a counter-
response, and counter-stimulus after determined kind of stimulating 
him/her (either verbally, nonverbally: using visual sort of communication, 
tactile kind of stimulation, degustation stimulations, etc.), he /she might 
counter-respond in a different way: ether using his/her visual capacities, or 
by becoming anxious so as to show vivid unequivocalness of the processed 
signs used by his/her receptive abilities. It implicates of course a sort of 
tensitivity, or as semiotics would express itself: a sort of a “conflictual 
situation” among parties concerned. This is above all due to the 
compensating component at this instance, which emerges as a consequence 
of an inadequate brain information processing. This is the point which shall 
be regarded here as a lack of meaning.  Naturally, the matter can be justified 
in the following way: parents raising an autistic child, after a certain period 
of experience with him/her are fully aware of the initial impossibility to 
comprehend their requests, complaints, or other emotionally minded 
reactions. Not only that such children’s reactions frequently are not clear, 
different, but they can even represent a “noise” and/or a point of 
interruption in the frames of the overall communication process. 
Semiotically speaking then, we have two parties concerned: parents and 
their children. Psychologically speaking however, an anxious situation is 
created, out of the incapacity to understand each other. I shall name such a 
stage, in Greimasian sense of the word, a “lack of meaning”. As should be 
obvious finally, an autistic child lacks uniting form with meaning, and/or:  
rightfully conceptualizing objects and subjects found in their surroundings. 
Or by other words: in the semiotic sense of the word, he/shedoes not hold 
a semiotic function. As should be obvious, intermediating this sort of 
communication is more than required. 
 
An attempt to establish semiotic relations 
In the Greimasian sense of the word however, like we stated,  a tensitivity 
component [ see: (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993) is noticed. Usually it 
occurs that parents ask assistance at this instance: in most of the cases, from 
occupational therapists. Depending on the level of the mental development 
of the child, (which are matters which shall not explicitly be discussed in 
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this contribution) a therapy is assigned. Working with an occupational 
therapists, speech therapist, etc., intermediates the process of 
communication. This should not only regard a one-way sort of 
communication, and/or signs’ processing. The acquisition process at this 
stage is mutual: by both sides, either parents or children.  
Except this sort of professionally assisting the child, which as I have 
mentioned, I shall not elaborate here in details, there is a phenomenon 
called a “comfort zone”. Each autistic child seeks to find his/her comfort 
zone. It is the place, the time, and/or moments when an autistic child is 
quiet, and/or closed in his/her “shell”.  It is this “stage” and/or “situation” 
which I am interested in. One may ask: why? Because of the following: 
first, one can then notice what are the interests of the child, and second, it 
is then, that the child is doing what he/she wishes to do. Or by other words: 
if anything different were exposed to him/her, an outburst of emotionality 
is what might occur. If such sorts of “unwanted stimulations” and/or 
“external requests” are contemporarily witnessed by the child (in the sense 
that everything comes from everywhere), then the child might experience 
sensory overload. The two concepts mentioned are in a relation of 
contradictoriness in the Greimasian sense of the word. 
Let us now try to elaborate some other matters related to the “comfort 
zone” of an autistic child.  
The mentioned repetitive activities, ritual-like actions, which may last for 
hours are what temporarily “calms” an autistic child. If one looks in details, 
each repetition is similar, but not identic. It thus proves the individual’s 
wanting-to-do, whishing-to-express, etc. The phenomenon, as may be 
presumed, is explicated in terms of its semiotic comprehension: as can be 
concluded from the modalizationprocess we are attempting to discuss. 
There is no question in the fact that such an individual cannot express 
his/her will, interest, request, and/or complaint the way neuro-typicals do. 
Let us attempt at exemplifying some presumably predictable “actions”. 
Playing with one and single toy only, constantly and repetitively, and 
returning it back to his /her co-communicators, may mean: “give it back to 
me”.  An instant screaming unexpectedly does not mean becoming 
aggressive. It may mean: “I want to go out”, etc. It is for these reasons that 
I call such a child’s reactions modalities, or simply: ways of 
expression(either in the metaphorical or in the proper sense of the word), 
most of which are initially not clear to the co-communicator, and/or to the 
receiver of the message. There is no exactness in their transmission of 
messages, at this instance as can be seen: therefore, they look unequivocal. 
Being unequivocal eventually, does not mean at all incomprehensible. 
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Owing to the fact that many of such actions gradually become 
comprehensive, either based on matters that can be individually selected 
by the receptors of various messages, or on the probability of the receptor’s 
predicting abilities, they all, cannot be said to remain meaningless. On the 
contrary, they become passionate: or in later stages, are carried out by 
“impassionate subjects” [ see: (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993)], represented 
by the individuals on the spectrum themselves.By being “impassionate” 
thus, the individuals on the spectrum seek to use other tools so as to remain 
into their “comfort zone”. Watching movies, nursery songs, etc., on a 
smartphone or a computer shows an attempt of their expressivity; an 
attempt, which understandably in the mentioned context is repetitive, 
therefore, transformable. Each repetition therefore is a new point of their 
expression attempts. It looks like as if communicating with the device, 
instead of a proper sort of communication. Specifically speaking, like we 
said, the nursery songs, the specific games used in smartphones used 
repetitively in determined period of times, show a clear message by the 
impassioned subject , at this instance: intermediated by technological tools, 
which I shall name here “knowable subjects” [ see: (Greimas & Fontanille, 
1993)]. The “knowable subject” in conclusion, and/or the “active subject” 
deduce and/or derive the meaning expressed by the child. Owing to the 
predictability and/or imprecision of the deduced meaning(s), one 
concludes that final semantic units in autistic children regard their 
developmental nature in growth: therefore, they find themselves in a stage 
of their “becoming’, and/or a constant transformability process.  
Otherwise, becomingin the semiotic sense of the word holds a crucial 
importance here: either in its ontological comprehension [ in the sense as 
used in: (Delleuze & Guattari, 1987)], or in its epistemological 
comprehension [ in the sense as used in: (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993)]. 
Ontologically then, each such "rhizome”, originating from the earlier 
mentioned disabilities, transforms itself gradually into new sorts of “lines” 
and “assemblages”. Finally then, instead of language, one sees speech acts, 
images, technological games, aimed at one and only purpose in frames of 
nonverbal children with autism: wishing to express themselves in a way 
that others could understand them.  
 
Conclusion: the process of semiosis itself 
I shall intend by a process of semiosis a uniting of form and meaning as a 
basic semiotic function, in the frames of the present text. Besides, as we 
have seen, at different developmental stages of an autistic child, such a 
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semiotic function may be conceptualized in the metaphorical sense of the 
word; or better expressed, within the unequivocalness of the processed 
signs. In conclusion therefore, by the mentioned term in the frames of the 
ASD phenomenon, I intend meanings emerging from the child’s behaviors 
which are transformable, changeable during his/her growth and 
psychological development.  
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